This paper combines experimental and field data to examine how those with discretion over punishment respond when confronted with social norms of leniency. Specifically, we test how individuals who have a responsibility to punish transgressions behave when confronted with the social norm of preferential treatment on people's birthdays. We first establish the existence of this social norm using a scenario study. We then show that individuals behave in the opposite way than that suggested by the social norm: they punish transgressors more severely on their birthdays, both in the realm of actual drunk driving enforcement and in an experimental lab setting where participants were given the responsibility to punish. An additional experiment provides evidence that this effect is driven by psychological reactance rather than by overcompensation for potential bias. We discuss both the theoretical and practical implications of our findings.
Introduction
Transgressions, including violations of the law, organizational rules, or societal norms, undermine the effective functioning of both organizations and social systems. As such, punishment serves a critical role in society because it deters transgressions by imposing a cost on the violator (Abrams 2012 , Becker 1968 ) and helps sustain the cooperation, coordination, and trust necessary for economic exchange Gächter 2000, 2002) . The drive to punish is embedded in the psychology and normative behavior of human beings across societies (Henrich et al. 2006) as well as that of several animal species(Clutton-Brock and Parker 1995)making it an inherent response to transgressions (Alicke 1992 , Walster 1966 . As societies have grown, these punishment norms have been institutionalized through modern legal systems and through the sanctioning policies of organizations.
While laws and regulations may provide guidelines for how to punish transgressions, individuals (e.g., judges or managers) or groups (e.g., juries) with punishment authority typically have discretion regarding whether and how much to punish a person who transgressed. This discretion is necessary because society and organizations cannot anticipate and optimally legislate how to punish the infinite permutations of transgressions and manage the mitigating circumstances of each fairly. While giving experts discretion over punishment may alleviate this problem, discretion also introduces the potential for bias because of the difficulty people have balancing multiple factors in an appropriate and rational way (Wegener and Petty 1997) .
Existing literature on discretion has primarily focused on one of its specific dangers: how it can lead to prejudicial treatment of others based on demographic characteristics (Antonovics and Knight 2004 , Blalock et al. 2011 , Smith and Alpert 2007 , Smith Makarios and Alpert 2006 , Tillyer and Engel 2010 , TomaskovicDevey Mason and Zingraff 2004 , Warren et al. 2006 ). However, discretion may be influenced by less obvious characteristics of the situation, in ways that also undermine the effectiveness of punishment and which may go undetected. One such situational characteristic is behavioral norms. Norms describe the behavior that is approved of (an injunctive norm), and/or that is common (a descriptive norm) in a given context (Cialdini Reno and Kallgren 1990) . Given the pervasiveness of norms and their powerful influence on behavior (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004, Goldstein Martin and Cialdini 2008) , it is critical to understand how they might bias discretionary punishment decisions in ways that undermine their efficacy.
In this paper, we examine how individuals responsible for punishing transgressions of others might be biased by a common category of behavioral norms: norms of leniency. In the course of their duties, individuals with the responsibility to punish transgressors and the authority to exercise discretion may encounter situations where it is socially normative to treat an offender more leniently than laws or standards would otherwise suggest. These situations may have characteristics that are relevant to a decision to exercise discretion-for example, when a police officer discovers a woman is in labor in a car he stopped for speeding-or completely irrelevant to it-for example, when it is the birthday of the driver of that car.
Exercising discretion to be lenient in the latter situation would interfere with the effectiveness of punishment.
The question of how individuals manage these conflicting motivations (punishment and leniency) is important, as situational factors that trigger norms of leniency are pervasive, but many do not justify the use of discretion in punishment decisions.
Exploring how people respond to these dual pressures should provide insight into how they reconcile competing motivations, whether they can correctly compensate for biases, and additional ways in which discretion may be problematic. Our central argument is that individuals with the responsibility to punish behave differently in the presence of a salient social norm to treat someone leniently than they do in the absence of that norm. However, we suggest that-contrary to common intuition-the resolution of this tension will result in harsher treatment of offenders rather than in increased leniency.
We also explore two psychological mechanisms that may explain this stringency effect. First, individuals responsible for punishing transgressors may overcompensate for the normative pressure they feel to be lenient. Concern about appearing lenient is salient in punishment contexts, where there are important professional motivations to avoid perceptions of favoritism by outsiders (Norton Vandello and Darley 2004) .
Compensation for bias requires a conscious effort to adjust one's judgment against the perceived potential bias. This effort requires both measuring the size of the bias accurately, as well as correcting for it adequately, a process we often fail at Petty 1995, 1997) . Second, increased stringency may be rooted in psychological reactance to explicit or perceived requests for preferential treatment or leniency. Individuals frequently feel threatened by external influences that they perceive to restrict their behavioral autonomy (Brehm 1966, Brehm and Brehm 1981) . Such threats may be triggered by explicit or perceived requests for help. When these requests are inappropriate or illegitimate (Berkowitz 1969) , they may result in the punisher increasing the magnitude or frequency of punishment in order to reassert her own autonomy.
In our investigation, we focus specifically on leniency norms associated with birthdays, for two reasons. First, even though this norm should be irrelevant to the decision to punish, a birthday generates a strong situational cue to treat an individual preferentially, thereby creating a conflict between a social norm of leniency and the social responsibility to punish. Second, birthdays are ideal for studying the effect of social norms in non-experimental field settings because they are randomly distributed in the population: birthday and non-birthday transgressors are randomly assigned to punishers, thus reducing endogeneity concerns about selection bias and causality when identifying variation in punishment decisions.
To investigate our predictions, we first establish that birthdays elicit a general norm of lenient and preferential treatment. Second, using ten years of DUI arrest records in the state of Washington (over 134,000 arrest records), we employ a quasi-experimental regression discontinuity approach that reveals that police officers are less likely to be lenient toward marginal offenders on their birthdays than on any other day.
In a series of robustness checks, we show that these results are unlikely to be explained by substantive differences in intoxication or public safety risk. Third, to generalize this result beyond a law enforcement context, we replicate the main effect of individuals treating trangressors less leniently on their birthdays in a lab experiment in which we vary the birthday status of individuals who have transgressed rules. This study verifies that increased stringency toward transgressors on their birthday generalizes to other behaviors and contexts. In a final scenario study, we explore two psychological mechanisms-overcompensation for bias and psychological reactance-in greater depth. This study suggests that psychological reactance is the mechanism that is more likely to motivate increased stringency in the face of a leniency norm.
Our research makes several theoretical contributions. First, our work extends existing literature on discrimination by shifting the focus from demographics to other factors-how people manage competing motivations to act. Second, we extend prior work on social norms by investigating how individuals behave when two normative motivations collide. Departing from prior research that has focused on how norms affect behavior, our research examines contexts where two different norms (toward leniency and toward punishment) conflict and how this conflict affects people's decisions to punish transgressions. Third, our work contributes to existing research on punishment by exploring how the social context of the transgression influences punishment decisions.
Our research also has important practical implications for those in roles that give them broad discretion to punish others for their transgressions, from managers and teachers to judges and jury members.
Such individuals have a social responsibility to punish transgressions, yet they often face conflicting motivations that, in their resolution, may undermine their ultimate effectiveness.
Theoretical Background

Discretion in Punishment
While laws and regulations provide guidelines for how to punish transgressions, individuals (e.g., police officers or judges) or groups (e.g., juries) typically have discretion regarding whether and how much to punish a transgressor. The discretion to arrest (Reiss 1984) or prosecute (LaFave 1970) offenders is a central element of the criminal justice system because it allows authorities to consider significant mitigating circumstances surrounding an act. For example, discretion can provide leniency for a woman who was violent toward an abusive man (e.g., Ammons 1994) . Discretion is particularly important for law enforcement officials in the field both to ensure they have the authority and information required to do their job effectively and because autonomy is central to officers' identities (Van Maanen 1974) . Some evidence even suggests that police discretion regarding arrests improves both criminal deterrence (Sherman 1984) and police accountability to the public (Pepinsky 1984 ). Yet discretion can also have negative consequences, including threats to due process (Kadish 1961) , abuses of power (Vorenberg 1976) , and biased treatment of individuals (Smith and Alpert 2007) .
Discretion therefore poses critical challenges for those charged with enforcing laws or regulations.
Specifically, it requires them to make sophisticated evaluations about whether they have justifiable reasons for employing discretionary leniency or stringency in the specific case, given their responsibility to enforce the relevant rules. The accuracy of these evaluations is critical, as exercising discretion poorly can delegitimize the work of authorities and undermine the equity and the efficacy of the enforcement system.
In the United States, the risk that discretion leads to unfair treatment of certain demographic groups has led to a number of high-profile initiatives-both national and statewide-to understand the extent and implications of this kind of bias (e.g., Lovrich et al. 2007 , Police Executive Research Forum 2001 and to design and implement training programs to reduce it (e.g., Jackson 2003, Paluck and Green 2009, Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission nd). The vast majority of information and training has been dedicated to ensuring that those responsible for punishing the transgressions of others eliminate severe treatment of certain offenders based on their demographic characteristics.
Meanwhile, across contexts, other triggers of biased treatment in punishment are usually absent from the public discourse. In this paper, we suggest that individuals who are charged with punishing the transgressions of others have difficulty managing situations where their formal responsibility to punish conflicts with a social norm to treat an offender leniently.
When Social Norms of Leniency Conflict with the Responsibility to Punish
Reconciling a strong social norm to treat someone leniently with a strong professional responsibility to punish those who transgress rules or regulations is challenging. Just as people have difficulty weighing their own transgressions against the help they provide others (Gino and Pierce 2009 , 2010 , Wiltermuth 2011 , so too might they fail to accurately weigh the transgressions of others with their own normative sense of wanting to treat someone leniently.
Factors Encouraging Leniency:
There are many social norms that trigger lenient treatment of others. Social norms of chivalry toward women, for example, lead to lesser sentences for female defendants (Crew 1991 , Doerner 2009 ) and inspire men to help women more than they help other men (Eagly and Crowley 1986) . Similarly, social norms of deference to authority (Cialdini 2009 , Milgram 1974 ) result in higher-status individuals receiving more lenient penalties than lower-status individuals, at least for minor-tomoderate transgressions (Karelaia and Keck 2012) . And strong social norms to treat attractive people preferentially translate into more lenient punishment of beautiful people (Piehl 1977 , Sigall and Ostrove 1975 , Stewart 1985 .
There are also strong social norms to treat individuals preferentially on "special days" such as birthdays. Birthdays are part of a larger class of days that have social or religious significance and that produce strong norms of helping, kindness, and forgiveness. Days with helping or giving norms are widespread across religions and cultures (e.g., Christmas, Hanukkah) and affect pro-social behavior such as charitable contributions (Jiobu and Knowles 1974, Waldfogel 1993 ). On birthdays, friends give gifts and some employers even give individuals a paid vacation day for their birthday (e.g., PCMT District Council and PSMT Council 2008) . Leniency on one's birthday is thus strongly ingrained as a social norm, to the extent it may even extend toward those who transgress important rules. For example, on December 2, 2012, the rapper known as "The Game" was pulled over by Los Angeles Police because the car he was driving had paper license plates. A celebrity website recounted that, although the car wasn't registered, the police released the man and did not tow his car "because it was his birthday." 1 Thus, when discretion is available, it may be used to give individuals a break on their birthday. Evidence that individuals receive more lenient treatment on their birthdays would be evidence that this social norm of leniency can dominate the responsibility to punish, at least in a context where this norm is triggered.
Factors Encouraging Severity:
An alternative perspective suggests that two psychological processes triggered by a conflict between a social norm of leniency and a responsibility to punish may result in more severe treatment for the offender: overcompensation for bias and psychological reactance.
The first of these processes is overcompensation for bias. From a cognitive standpoint, authorities may be sensitive to situational cues that may trigger biased treatment because of the importance of objectivity in punishment. When attention is drawn to factors that may bias an individual's evaluation of a target, a typical response is to make an effort to correct for the bias by adjusting the judgment away from the direction of the bias (Martin 1986 , Schwarz and Bless 1992 , Wegener and Petty 1997 "in an amount commensurate with the perceived amount of bias" (Wegener and Petty 1995, p. 38) . This correction process is dominantly cognitive (Devine 1989) , as it requires awareness of the bias and a motivation to address it Petty 1995, 1997) .
Overcompensation may also occur because the punisher, like individuals in other settings (Norton et al. 2004) , may be motivated to avoid being seen as showing favoritism. Since her professional responsibility to is to ensure that punishment is based on the severity of the offense, any perception of favoritism or bias might weaken her sense of power and authority. Recent work on how underrepresented minorities and women evaluate and choose team members and potential hires sheds light on how this overcompensation process might occur more broadly. Duguid and colleagues argue that minority team members may evaluate minority candidates more harshly than majority team members do to avoid being perceived as favoring other minorities, a process referred to as "favoritism threat" (Duguid 2011, Duguid Loyd and Tolbert 2012) . A fair and balanced approach may be difficult for such evaluators to demonstrate over a limited number of candidates, so they err on the side of stringency. Research on criminal justice suggests that black police officers (Brown and Frank 2006) and black judges (Steffensmeier and Britt 2001) may similarly overcompensate to avoid perceptions of favoritism.
In other words, when someone responsible for enforcing rules or regulations confronts a transgressor on his birthday, the social norm to treat that person favorably will be salient. While typically the salience of a norm increases the likelihood of behaving consistently with it (Batson and Powell 2003) , someone with a responsibility to treat people equitably (i.e., to not succumb to a helpfulness norm) may overcorrect for this biasing factor due to a desire to appear objective.
The second process triggered by a conflict between a social norm of leniency and a responsibility to punish is psychological reactance. Psychological reactance theory (Brehm 1966) proposes that individuals frequently react strongly to any external influence that restricts or eliminates their behavioral autonomy.
When individuals perceive a demand-either explicit or implicit-to help someone, they are less likely to do so because they experience the demand as a threat to their autonomy (Berkowitz 1973) . Regardless of the source of perceived threats to one's autonomy (e.g., formal rules, choice restrictions, influence from norms, suggestions), they motivate the individual to counter the restriction and take actions that reestablish the threatened autonomy (Brehm 1966) . This reactance can operate below conscious awareness or intent (Chartrand Dalton and Fitzsimons 2007) but can be extreme enough to cause a behavioral backlash in which the individual does the opposite of what she is being asked to do (Fitzsimons and Lehmann 2004) .
Two factors are likely to trigger reactance when authorities have discretion over punishment but are confronted with a norm of leniency. First, in situations where individuals have the discretion to help others, reactance triggered by a request for help will be magnified to the extent that the freedom "not to help" is important (Brehm and Brehm 1981, p. 171) . Since those charged with penalizing transgressions have a strong motivation not to help those whom they are obligated to punish, these situations will likely elicit high levels of reactance. Although no studies have directly examined reactance as a function of the importance not to help target others, Brehm and Cole (1966) found that requests for reciprocal help were counterproductive when an authority was charged with evaluating another person accurately.
Second, reactance effects increase when requests for help appear inappropriate or illegitimate (Berkowitz 1969 (Berkowitz , 1973 . For example, Berkowitz (1969) found that individuals were less likely to help when they felt they were being coerced, and Gibbons and Wicklund (1982) suggested that acts of spontaneous helping require a situational cue to help that is both salient and legitimate. It might seem legitimate to let someone choose a restaurant that no one else likes on his birthday, but a birthday might not be viewed as a legitimate reason for him to be excused from the consequences of transgressing rules or laws.
In sum, we suggest that when an individual with the responsibility to punish people who transgressed faces a conflicting motivation to treat that person leniently, she is more likely to treat that person more severely both due to bias overcompensation and psychological reactance. We test this prediction in four studies.
Pre-Study: Establishing a Social Norm of Leniency
We first examined whether birthdays indeed elicit a norm of lenient treatment, specifically in a context where an individual commits a transgression on her birthday. We asked 111 students from local universities in the southeastern United States (39% male, M age =23, SD=3.3) to predict their own behavior in two scenarios describing the behavior of a male, college-aged student who engaged in a transgression. The study employed a 2 (day of transgression: birthday vs. other day) X 2 (order: birthday scenario first vs. control scenario first) mixed design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two order conditions and read each of the two scenarios. We note that the order in which the scenarios were presented did not affect participants' answers (F<1). The interaction term was also insignificant (F<1). After reading each scenario, the participants indicated their likelihood of overlooking the behavior and helping the student on a 7-point scale (ranging from 1=very unlikely to 7=very likely). The first scenario involved an intoxicated driver asking the student to switch seats with him after seeing a police sobriety checkpoint on the road ahead. The second scenario involved a peer stealing money from the tip pool shared with coworkers. We created two versions of each scenario, which varied in terms of whether the protagonist transgressed on his birthday or on a different day. Consistent with a norm of leniency, participants indicated they would more likely overlook the student's behavior and help him in the birthday condition than in the control condition (M=5.06, SD=1.61 vs.
M=4
. 03, SD=1.87), F(1, 109)=21.92, p<.001 . These results indicate that people indeed believe that the presence of a salient social norm of leniency based on birthdays would affect their treatment of transgression.
Study 1: Field Evidence from Drunk Driving Stops by Officers
We next identify the impact of social norms of leniency on the punishment of transgressions in the context of traffic stops in the United States. Specifically, we study arrests involving suspicion of driving under the influence (DUI) of alcohol in the state of Washington. In all U.S. states, driving while intoxicated by alcohol (drunk driving) or other drugs is prohibited. Drunk driving enforcement has increased dramatically in the United States over the past 30 years due to its severe impact on public safety. Economists have estimated that intoxicated drivers create externalities of at least 30 cents per mile driven due to social welfare costs of traffic fatalities (Levitt and Porter 2001) . Alcohol-related fatalities in the United States were estimated to be 11,948 in 2010, approximately 36 percent of all traffic fatalities (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 2010). Furthermore, deterrence of drunk driving is difficult, given that the Washington State Patrol estimates that only one out of every 2,000 drunk drivers is actually arrested. 2 DUI laws are primarily enforced by the many police agencies in Washington state, including municipal, county, federal, state, and Indian Nations agencies. The largest enforcer, the Washington State Patrol, is responsible for monitoring and enforcing the state's highway systems as well as supporting local agencies. State Patrol officers, or "troopers," are a highly trained elite group; approximately 600 troopers patrol state highways each day. Troopers typically have much greater expertise than officers at other agencies in DUI and other traffic stops for three reasons. First, unlike other agencies, the primary focus of the State Patrol is traffic safety. Second, the State Patrol can be more selective in hiring because its superior compensation and benefits attract a stronger pool of applicants. Finally, the State Patrol spends more time training its officers in traffic enforcement than other agencies, whose officers must cover a much broader range of enforcement activities. Troopers must pass rigorous background checks and must pass written, fitness, polygraph, medical, and psychological testing. Applicants to the State Patrol must pass a seven-week Arming Class, after which a few will be admitted to the full 26-week basic training course and subsequent eight-week field training.
In Washington State, DUI laws are primarily based on the driver's blood alcohol level (BAC).
Drivers whose BAC exceeds .08 percent are said to be in per se violation of state law and have little legal defense. Such drivers face minimum penalties of $865, 24 hours incarceration, and 90 days suspended license for their first offense. Drivers with BAC levels above .15 percent are subject to even greater penalties, including minimum fines of $1,120, two days incarceration, and a one-year revocation of license. Penalties rapidly escalate with repeat offenses. A second offense with BAC below .15, for example, brings a minimum of 30 days incarceration and a two-year revocation of license. Figure 1 presents the average relationship between drinking behavior and BAC, conditional on gender and body weight. Many other factors influence BAC, including food consumption, regular alcohol consumption, and genetic factors. Furthermore, as the body processes alcohol, BAC drops at an average rate of 0.015 per hour.
When an officer suspects a driver of DUI, she typically administers a field sobriety test. This test includes Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus, cognitive, and motor skills tests. Furthermore, the officer administers a mobile breath test ("breathalyzer"), which estimates the BAC of the driver. Unlike in many U.S. states, mobile breath tests in Washington are not admissible in court, so they are used to help the officer determine the intoxication of the driver. If the officer determines the driver to be intoxicated, the driver is placed under arrest and taken to a field station for a formal (and admissible in court) breath test.
If the officer observes a mobile BAC greater than .08, the decision is straightforward. The driver is almost certainly in per se violation, and the officer arrests the driver. But the decision is much less clear if the mobile BAC is below .08. When the mobile BAC is below .08, the officer has discretion over whether or not to arrest the driver. Arresting the driver presents several potential costs for the officer. First, the arrest process takes the officer off the road for several hours and thereby precludes her from potentially arresting an even more highly intoxicated driver. Second, drivers who do not violate the per se rule are much more difficult to prosecute, as a conviction must rely on the officer's evaluation of the driver's intoxication. Even if the driver is convicted, the penalties are considerably lighter for low-BAC drivers. Consequently, most of these cases are plea-bargained with minimal penalties. 3 Because of this difficulty of conviction, prosecuting attorneys typically discourage officers from arresting drivers with low BAC.
As compared to others responsible for punishing transgressors, law enforcement officials may be particularly likely to react negatively to perceptions that offenders are soliciting lenient treatment from them.
They are accustomed to excuses and pleas for leniency from those whom they are penalizing, to the extent that such pleas becomes tiresome and prompt cynicism (Van Maanen 1974) . Research on leniency in law enforcement suggests that officer have "pet peeves," including many related to the demeanor of offenders, that can elicit reactive and more severe responses (Schafer and Mastrofski 2005) . Contrition and verbally accepting responsibility for one's action may elicit more lenient responses from law enforcement, while soliciting special treatment may trigger a reactive response (Schafer and Mastrofski 2005) . Indeed, recent work by van Prooijen and Kerpeshoek (2011) suggests that individuals may exert excess retribution when given discretion to punish criminals, but only when they feel their autonomy is threatened.
3 A plea bargain is an agreement between the prosecuting attorney and the defense counsel (with judicial approval) that avoids trial. Plea bargains reduce prosecutorial workload and avoid protracted trials with highly likely outcomes.
Data
Our data include every DUI arrest in Washington State from [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . These data include the name, age, gender, and ethnicity of the driver, as well as the date, time, and location of the arrest. The data also include the primary criminal charge, which allows us to exclude DUI arrests that are secondary to more severe crimes such as weapons violations, violent crimes, or outstanding arrest warrants. The data also identify the mobile BAC reading, when taken, 4 as well as the court-admissible BAC reading from the police station. Since the data also identify the exact time of each test, we know the length of delay before the driver was given the court-admissible test. 5 We present basic summary statistics in Table 1 for both the pooled sample as well as the sample separated by birthday/non-birthday. The average BAC for all arrests is 0.13, with 94 percent being above the per se threshold. Approximately one out of every 300 arrests is a birthday driver.
The average age is 34, with 21 percent being women and 81 percent being ethnically white (non-Hispanic).
One weakness in our data is that we are unable to observe drivers who were stopped for suspicion of DUI but not arrested. Only drivers who were arrested appear in our data, creating potential survivor bias in any standard regression analysis. We will address this weakness by exploiting the discrete threshold at BAC = .08 in order to infer distributions of non-arrested drivers in the data.
Identification Strategy
We examine how individuals choose to punish transgressions under social norms of leniency. The norm of interest in our context is leniency on the driver's birthday, which has several important characteristics from an identification perspective. First, the norm of treating people preferentially on their birthday is universally known and widely observed in the United States and most of the world. violators. These "marginal offenders" are arrested at the discretion of the officer. Throughout the paper, we will use the term "marginal" to refer to drivers who fall just below the per se blood alcohol threshold. 6 We identify officer stringency in DUI enforcement by observing how often an officer arrests per se offenders relative to marginal offenders. While all officers must arrest per se offenders, extremely stringent enforcers would arrest many more marginal offenders than would lenient enforcers. Officers may be able to identify extremely intoxicated drivers (e.g. BAC>.15) before the traffic stop, but it is unlikely they would be able to ex ante distinguish between marginal offenders and those with BAC levels just above the per se limit.
Consequently, the ratio of traffic stops that involve BACs just above the threshold (e.g. BAC=0.08) should be approximately equal to the frequency involving BACs just below (e.g. BAC=0.79), as should the appearance of intoxication when the driver is first confronted. Given the approximately equal number of marginal and per se violators stopped and tested, the relative frequency of arrest of marginal offenders relative to borderline per se offenders is unlikely to reflect the choice to stop drivers and instead will reflect the decision to punish marginal offenders. 7
Empirical Model
We employ a quasi-experimental regression discontinuity (RD) design, which involves estimating the impact of a discrete threshold in a continuous independent variable on an outcome variable (Imbens and Lemieux 2008) . This methodology was initially developed in psychology (Thistlewaite and Campbell 1960) In our context, the discrete threshold is defined by the per se rule at a BAC of .08. Because officers cannot observe on which side of the threshold a moderately intoxicated driver lies before arrest, the assignment near the threshold is random. Furthermore, it is reasonable to believe that the characteristics of drivers just on either side of the threshold are the same, as, once again, officers cannot identify which side the driver will be on before he is pulled over. In our context, because we will compare the ratio of per se to marginal offenders of birthday drivers to no-birthday drivers, the critical assumption is that marginal birthday offenders are not more worthy of arrest on some legitimate legal rule than marginal non-birthday offenders.
We will support this assumption through robustness tests presented later in the paper.
We expect that individuals with the responsibility to punish transgressions will be more severe (i.e., less lenient) when punishing transgressions on a driver's birthday. Since officers have little discretion on per se offenders, we expect them to behave similarly for these drivers regardless of whether or not it is their birthday. In contrast, since officers have considerable discretion regarding whether to arrest marginal offenders, we expect officers to arrest a higher proportion of the marginal offenders stopped on their birthday. Since officers cannot distinguish between these two groups near the threshold prior to the stop, we expect officers to stop approximately equivalent numbers of each group near the margin. Our methodology does not depend on drivers drinking identically on their birthday as on other days.
We therefore expect the ratio of per se arrestees to marginal offenders to be lower for birthday drivers than for non-birthday drivers. This would suggest that officers, when given discretion to release marginally drunk drivers on their birthdays, instead choose aggressive enforcement. We represent the basic logic of this approach in Figure 2 , which presents the distribution of BAC field tests for both birthday (black) and nonbirthday (green) drivers. Each point represents all drivers in a bin with .001 BAC width. The per se threshold is represented by the vertical line at BAC=.08. Each set of dots is fit with a fifth-dimensional polynomial on either side of the threshold, with 95 percent confidence intervals represented with dashed lines. Not surprisingly, the birthday data are noisier, because fewer (one in 300) people are arrested on their birthdays than on other days, thus making each bin less precise. Regardless, one can observe the distinct difference in the discontinuities at the per se threshold. The discontinuity for the birthday arrests is considerably smaller, suggesting that marginally drunk drivers are more likely to be arrested on their birthdays than on other days.
Results
Our first specification uses logistic regression to estimate the probability that an arrest involves a driver birthday as a function of the per se rule. If officers treated birthday drivers identically to other drivers, we should expect arrests immediately on each side of the threshold to have equal probability of involving a birthday. If, instead, officers are harder on birthday drivers, as we predicted, then we would expect a discontinuity in the probability of a birthday at the per se rule. If officers are indeed more aggressive in punishing marginally drunk drivers on their birthday, we should expect a higher probability of a birthday for BAC < .08 and therefore a negative coefficient for the per se threshold. It is important in RD designs to account for the underlying relationship between the dependent variable (birthday) and the running variable that defines the threshold (BAC). We use a quintic polynomial for our BAC running variable to allow for sufficient functional flexibility. Our results are also robust to alternative polynomial specifications.
Our base model, which includes no controls, is presented in column 1 of Table 2 , with logit coefficients and robust standard errors clustered at the officer level in parentheses. 8 Column 2 adds controls for the month, year, and calendar day. Column 3 adds driver demographic information, including age (quartic polynomial) and dummy variables for gender and ethnicity. Column 4 adds dummy variables for each county.
Each column shows a negative relationship between the per se threshold and the probability of an arrestee birthday, with identification at the 0.05 and 0.1 probability levels. The correct interpretation for this is that the probability of an arrestee birthday distinctly drops when the BAC level crosses the threshold at 0.08 (thus removing the officer's discretion). These models suggest that marginally drunk drivers who are stopped are more likely to be arrested if it is their birthday than on other days. Column 5 replaces the logistic regression with a linear regression (OLS), again clustering standard errors at the officer level. The OLS model shows similar results and suggests the magnitude of the impact of the birthday. Given the base rate of birthday arrestees of approximately 0.4 percent of per se violators, being stopped on one's birthday increases one's probability of arrest by over 50 percent near the 0.08 BAC threshold. We note that we cannot estimate the marginal effect at other points farther below the threshold due to our identification strategy.
---------------------------------------------------INSERT TABLE 2 HERE ---------------------------------------------------
Additional Analyses: Organizational Differences: Our previous analysis shows that, on average, police officers are less lenient toward drivers who are stopped on their birthdays. Recent research, however, suggests that individual biases can be reduced or eliminated with extensive task experience or training. Cialdini, Sagarin, and Rice (2001) , for example, argue that training can help individuals resist unethical persuasion from an advertiser and avoid reactance that might lead to equally inefficient outcomes. This suggests that with sufficient training and experience, authorities might be less likely show bias against transgressors on their birthday.
We examine this possibility by comparing the behavior of local police and State Patrol troopers. We note that there is tremendous heterogeneity across the municipal police agencies, sheriff's offices, and tribal police that we pool together as "local." The impact of these detailed organizational characteristics is beyond the scope of this paper. Thus, we focus instead on the organizational differences between local police agencies and the State Patrol. We did not have an a priori hypothesis on the impact of these potential differences on the results discussed above. Rather, these analyses were driven by interviews with officers and administrators, who outlined significant training, job task, and selection differences between the two groups.
Based on the three characteristics of state troopers described above, including their superior training in traffic stops, they might be more capable than members of local police agencies of addressing potential biases in DUI stops. 9 To examine these potential differences, we repeat the fully controlled logistic regression model presented in Table 2 , column 4, for two separate samples of local police and state patrol troopers. The results are presented in Table 2 , columns 6 and 7. The discontinuity in column 7, which represents local police, is well-identified (p < .05), while there appears to be no discontinuity for the trooper model in column 6. This suggests that most of the stringency toward birthday drivers observed in the pooled sample of columns 1-5 was driven by local police and that the state troopers simply introduced noise. State troopers appear to treat birthday drivers identically to all others. intervals. The lack of discontinuity for state troopers is obvious. The probability that an arrest occurs on a birthday is nearly identical for almost all BAC intervals. We see a marked difference in the figure for local police, with a distinct discontinuity at the per se threshold. Marginally drunk arrestees to the left of the threshold are considerably more likely to have been arrested on their birthdays.
---------------------------------------------------INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE ---------------------------------------------------
Robustness Tests: Our finding of higher stringency by local police toward birthday drivers strongly supports our assertion of overcompensation, but raises a number of alternative explanations. One natural concern with our identification strategy is that some unobserved variable could be correlated with birthday and legitimate reasons to arrest a marginally drunk driver. While the lack of discontinuity found above for the elite state troopers suggests this is not the case, it is still possible that such a variable might exist only for those arrested by local police. We first note that our models control for location (county), so such a variable would need to be correlated with agency type within county. We also note that because we control for a large number of driver characteristics, it would have to be based on some other factor. Regardless, if one believes that local and state officers stop different sets of drivers (not accounted for by demographics), several possible alternative explanations could exist.
First, the mobile BAC of birthday drivers stopped by local police could not accurately reflect their level of alcohol consumption, relative to other drivers. In this alternative explanation, marginally drunk birthday drivers still have alcohol in their stomach that has not yet entered the bloodstream due to binge drinking or a stomach full of food, and officers arrest the driver knowing that their BAC will continue to climb above the per se threshold. In such a case, the decision to disproportionately arrest marginally drunk birthday drivers would be rational and show great foresight. A second alternative explanation is that marginally drunk birthday drivers are inherently more dangerous than their non-birthday counterparts and that stringency toward them is a rational public safety response. A third possibility is that birthday drivers are more likely to drink (and drive) more later in the evening, making their arrest a pre-emptive approach.
We systematically examine these alternative explanations by testing differences in the characteristics of the arrested drivers. To examine whether birthday drivers are more likely to increase in BAC due to prestop drinking patterns, we examine the change in BAC between the mobile and station tests. This change reflects how much the driver's BAC increased or decreased between arrest and arrival at the testing facility during a time where additional drinking was not possible. The differences between average BAC changes of birthday (-0.0011) and non-birthday (-0.0022) drivers are indistinguishable (p=.50), as are the number of minutes between the two tests (60.4 vs. 59.1, p=.51). The average time of arrest is also nearly identical between the two groups (22:54 vs. 22:59, p=.58), suggesting that officers are not preemptively arresting birthday drivers earlier in the evening to avoid later drinking. Finally, we examine the likelihood that an accident (which we excluded from our main analysis) involved an intoxicated birthday driver compared to other drunk drivers. Accidents are frequently used in studies of police discrimination as accurate baselines of true driving behavior (e.g., Levitt and Porter 2001) , since they involve no police discretion. The relationship between drunk-driving accidents and birthday drivers is indistinguishable. The percentage of drunk-driving accidents involving birthday drivers is 0.43 percent as compared to 0.41 for discretionary officer arrests (p=.39). Together, these tests cast doubt on alternative explanations for local police stringency toward birthday drivers based on public safety reasoning.
Study 2: Behavioral Lab Study
The prior analysis shows that officers are more likely to arrest marginally drunk drivers on their birthday than on other days. Although the field data provides strong evidence that authorities with the responsibility to punish transgressors are more stringent in situations with salient norms of leniency, these data do not reveal whether this is a more general behavioral response or whether it is idiosyncratic to our setting. We address this concern by designing a laboratory experiment using a different type of transgression.
Method
Participants and Design. One hundred and one participants from a U.K.-based behavioral lab (31% male; M age =25.7 years, SD=8.3) participated in the study for a £10 payment. The experiment employed a 2 (social norm: birthday vs. control) X 2 (social responsibility: bias salient vs. control) between-subjects design.
Procedure. Participants were informed that the lab was partnering with a nearby school specializing in English as a Second Language for a student essay-writing competition. Participants were all assigned to the role of "evaluators" and tasked to judge three of the essays competing for prizes. They were also told that because teachers typically know the students in their classes before grading any of their work, the students had written a short paragraph about themselves, which would be attached to each essay.
We used actual example essays from the American College Testing writing assessment (available at http://www.actstudent.org/writing/sample/index.html). The essays all argued in favor of extending high school by one year. We chose two essays that the assessment service used as examples of poorly written essays (scoring "1" and "2") and one example of a good essay (scoring "5").
Participants were provided with a scoring sheet and contest rules, which included a rule that made essays over 500 words ineligible for contest prizes. They were instructed to judge the positive and negative attributes of each essay and then provided with the opportunity to nominate any of the essays for one of the three prizes: a 20% tuition fee refund (first prize), a 5% tuition refund (second prize), or a new backpack (honorable mention). Finally, they were told that the students were aware that the essays were being evaluated by outside graders and that the competition winners, chosen by them, would be announced in class "this coming Wednesday." Instructions stressed that the competition had meaningful outcomes for the students and that it was important for them to take their job seriously.
Manipulation. Each participant evaluated the same three essays; however, the handwritten personal statements stapled to the essays varied. There were three versions of the personal statements: one written by a Brazilian female, one by a Mexican male, and one by a Spaniard whose gender could not be determined.
These three personal statements were counterbalanced across the essays to ensure that any differences in participants' evaluations or prize nominations were unrelated to any part of the personal messages' content except the social norm manipulation.
The social norm manipulation was appended to the personal statement attached to the essay of the 
Measures
Dependent Variable: Nomination for a Prize. The word counts of each essay were handwritten on each of the essays. At 513 words, Essay #3 violated the 500-word limit contest rule by 13 words. Neither of the other two essays violated the word limit. The dependent variable of interest was whether participants treated Essay #3 leniently by nominating it for any prize even though it violated the word limit rule.
Manipulation Check: Score. Participants were instructed to give the essays a positive grade of up to 30 for unique ideas (10 points), persuasiveness (10 points), and language quality (10 points), and then subtract points for spelling, punctuation, and grammatical errors (two points each). This total score (positive points minus negative points) represented the essay writer's grade. Negative scores were possible after subtracting points for all the errors the essays contained. We used participants' scores as a manipulation check to confirm that the essay containing the social norm manipulation was evaluated as the "best" essay among the three, and thus the most likely to be nominated for a prize, if the evaluator treated going over the word limit for eligibility leniently.
Results
A repeated measures ANOVA with final score as the within-subjects factor confirmed the ranking of the essays provided by the American College Testing service. Essay #3 had the highest overall score (M=12.3, SD=9.9), Essay #2 the second highest overall score (M=8.6, SD=9.8), and Essay #1 the lowest overall score (M=-17.5, SD=17.0). All averaged scores significantly differed from each other, F(2,200)=222, p<.000. We believe it is justifiable, therefore, to interpret the failure to nominate Essay #3 (the best essay) for any of the three prizes as evidence that evaluators were penalizing this essay writer for transgressing the word limit rule, effectively disqualifying the writer from the competition.
We next examined whether our social norm manipulation influenced participants' decisions to behave leniently toward transgressors. Forty-six of 50 participants (92%) in the non-birthday condition still nominated the best essay for a prize, but only 40 of 51 participants (78%) in the birthday condition did the same, χ 2 (1, N = 101) = 3.68, p=.055.
We also ran a logistic regression with nomination for any of the prizes as the dependent variable, and birthday condition, bias condition, and their interaction as independent variables. The coefficients for the bias salience condition (B=.087, expB=1.09, 95% CI = .14 to 8.42, p=.93) and the interaction of the two conditions (B=1.23, expB=3.67, 95% CI = .30 to 45.45, p=.31) were not significant, indicating that the bias salience condition did not affect whether Essay #3 was nominated for a prize. However, the same logistic regression revealed a significant, negative coefficient for the birthday condition (B=-1.705, expB=.18, 95% CI = .03 to .97, p=.046), indicating that Essay Writer #3 was less likely to be nominated for a prize if the author of the essay had written that it was his or her birthday than if he or she had not.
Discussion
To test the generalizability of the effects observed in Study 1, in this second study we focused on leniency toward people who transgressed the rules of a competition. The results provide further support for the claim that people are more likely to punish others' transgressions stringently when social norms of leniency are activated than when they are not. Although the results of this experiment are consistent with those found in our field data, they do not identify the psychological mechanism driving the observed effects.
Thus, we designed a final scenario study that explores which of the two psychological mechanisms we proposed may be driving our effects.
Study 3: Exploring Psychological Mechanisms
Both overcompensation and reactance predict that enforcers will be more severe toward transgressors on the transgressors' birthdays. To disentangle which mechanism drives the effect, we explore the interaction between the transgressor and enforcer in greater detail. Research confirms that the behavior of offenders during their interactions with enforcers impacts the exercise of discretion (Day and Ross 2011, Engel et al. 2011) . If increased severity for offenders on their birthdays is driven by overcompensation for biases, then severity should increase regardless of the behavior of the offender, as long as the enforcer is aware of the potential for preferential treatment in the context. However, if increased severity for offenders on their birthdays is driven by reactance, then severity should only increase when the enforcer perceives that the transgressor is trying to persuade him to be lenient-in other words, when the transgressor is threatening the enforcer's freedom to exercise discretion.
We therefore conducted a scenario study that varied whether the offender mentioned his birthday to the enforcer. If the results are driven by overcompensation for biases, then there should be no difference in the increased severity between individuals who mention their birthday and those who do not (but whose birthdays are known to the authority). If the results are driven by reactance, then there should be higher levels of severity for individuals who mention it is their birthday, but not for those who do not. Like those who illegitimately request help in Berkowitz's (1969) earlier work, an enforcer may react to a transgressor volunteering that it is her birthday as a threat to the enforcer's freedom to spontaneously exercise leniency in this context. However, transgressors who do not volunteer this information may be treated more leniently, as their behavior will not signal the same threat to the authority's freedom of action.
Method
Participants. Four hundred and sixty-one participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk (59% male; M age =30.1 years, SD=9.9) completed a survey online for a $0.50 payment.
Design and Procedure. Participants who accepted the study invitation followed a link to an online survey, which randomly assigned them to one of three conditions: birthday-mentioned, birthday-notmentioned, and control. Participants read the following instructions in the control condition; the changes we introduced in the other conditions are included in parentheses:
In this study, you will play the role of a police officer. Please take a few seconds to imagine how you ' Participants were first required to make a choice between charging the driver and releasing him with a warning, and then asked to estimate the likelihood that they would arrest the driver, on a scale from 0% likely to 100% likely. Then they were asked to evaluate to what extent they felt manipulated by the driver.
Responses were recorded on the same seven-point scale ranging from "not at all" to "extremely." Finally, as a manipulation check, respondents were asked "People generally believe they should be nice to others on their birthdays. To what extent did you think about this norm while making decisions about the driver?"
Responses were recorded on the same seven-point scale ranging from "not at all" to "extremely." If greater stringency on an individual's birthday is driven by overcompensation for bias, then this stringency should be evident regardless of whether the driver mentions the birthday or the enforcer accidentally discovers it. If, however, increased stringency is driven by psychological reactance to the threat of the enforcer's freedom of action, then increased stringency should be evident in the "birthday-mentioned" condition only.
Results
Nine participants failed an attention filter, and an additional 4 others did not complete one of the primary outcome measures. These 13 participants were dropped from the analyses; results are reported using the remaining 448. As we expected, the manipulation did trigger respondents to think about the social norm of treating people nicely on their birthdays. Thirteen percent of respondents reported they would arrest the driver if his birthday was discovered accidentally, while 20% reported they would arrest the driver if he mentioned his birthday himself. In the control condition, 21% of people reported they would arrest the driver. A chi square test revealed that individuals were similarly stringent to drivers who mentioned their birthday and drivers in the control condition, χ 2 (1, N = 297) = .10, p =.75, but together these conditions were different from the birthday-notmentioned condition, χ 2 (1, N = 448) = 3.30, p =.069, indicating that leniency was more likely when one's birthday was not mentioned.
We found a similar pattern of results when considering the continuous dependent variable. Our manipulation affected the estimated likelihood of arresting the driver, F(2,445) = 8.46, p<.001. Respondents reported they would be 20% likely to arrest the driver if they discovered accidentally that it was the driver's birthday, but 30% likely if the driver mentioned the birthday himself. In the control condition, respondents reported they would be 32% likely to arrest the driver. Differences between the birthday-not-mentioned and the birthday-mentioned conditions, (t(298) =3.17, p=.002) , and between the birthday-not-mentioned and the control condition, (t(297)=4.00, p<.001), were both significant. There was not a significant difference between the birthday-mentioned condition and the control condition (t(295)=67, p=.49).
These results demonstrate that individuals punish more harshly when the transgressor mentions explicitly that it is his birthday, compared to when he does not. This supports the idea that this effect is driven by psychological reactance-being motivated to act in a way that counters any perceived threat to one's freedom of action when in the role of an enforcer-rather than by overcompensation for bias. As additional support for this conclusion, there were also significant differences across conditions in terms of =5.21, p<.001) . Reactance theory specifically describes the higher levels of resentment associated with higher levels of felt external pressure (Berkowitz 1973 , Brehm 1966 ). Thus, the higher levels of self-reported resentment among participants reading the birthday-mentioned scenario provide further evidence that reactance is driving our effect. Participants were then asked to make both a forced choice prediction about whether the officer would arrest them or release them with a warning, and estimate the likelihood that they would be arrested (versus let go with a warning), on the same 0% likely to 100% likely scale. They failed to predict the negative consequences of mentioning their birthday. Participants predicted that officers would be more lenient towards individuals in either birthday condition, regardless of whether that fact was mentioned by them, χ 2 (1, N = 306) = 9.45, p =.009. When asked to predict what the officer would do, only 25% of the respondents in the birthday-mentioned condition believed they would be arrested, significantly fewer than the 45% of respondents in the control condition (χ 2 (1, N = 202) = 9.45, p =.002). In contrast, there was no significant difference between the predictions of respondents in the control condition and respondents in the birthdaynot-mentioned condition (χ 2 (1, N = 201) = 2.42, p =.12). Results were similar for the continuous dependent variable. Individuals thought they would be significantly less likely to be arrested if it was their birthday and they mentioned it (with a 41% likelihood of being let go with a warning) or even if they didn't (a 43% likelihood), compared to another day (50% likelihood of being arrested), F(2,303) = 3.22, p<.041.
Individuals' Intuitions about Birthdays
The difference between people's predictions about the impact of transgressing on their birthday and their actual behavior in our experiments suggests that the increased severity experienced by transgressors who make the social norm of leniency salient is likely unexpected.
General Discussion
Our evidence from the field and the lab was consistent with the predictions of our theory. When confronted with a social norm of leniency, individuals with the responsibility to punish and the discretion over how that punishment is meted out treat transgressors more stringently. In our studies, we used the transgressor's birthday as our manipulation of a social norm of leniency, as it has many attractive characteristics that permit quasi-experimental empirical observation of this phenomenon in the field. This stringency, which we identified both in the field and in experimental lab manipulations, runs counter to what individuals believe happens to transgressors on their birthdays and counter to the treatment they would expect for themselves if they were to transgress on their birthday. A further scenario study suggested this effect is driven by psychological reactance-a negative affective reaction to the perception that the enforcer's freedom to respond with discretion is being threatened.
Theoretical and Practical Implications
Our results contribute to several literatures. First, they help us understand how discretion is exercised in the field, thus deepening our knowledge of how discrimination operates. Work on discrimination has focused almost exclusively on demographic characteristics such as age, race, ethnicity, and gender (Paluck and Green 2009) . Our research shows that other, less obvious factors will also lead individuals to discriminate and treat transgressions differentially. This suggests that current levels of concern about the ways in which discretion leads to discriminatory outcomes may be underestimated and that we need to extend our vigilance to consider how discrimination undermines the efficiency of punishment. It also deepens our understanding about the challenges humans have in debiasing their judgments and behavior Petty 1995, 1997) .
Second, this paper contributes to our knowledge of how social norms affect behavior, specifically examining how individuals behave when two normative motivations collide. The large body of work in both psychology (e.g., Cialdini Kallgren and Reno 1991) and economics (e.g., Fehr and Gächter 2002) that examines the power of social norms on individual behavior has focused primarily on how individual social norms motivate behavior. Instead, our work examines how individuals respond to competing motivations and how these types of internal conflicts influence behavior.
Third, our research contributes to a broader literature on punishment from psychological (Fragale et al. 2009 , Treviño 1992 , economic (Fehr and Gächter 2000) , and sociological (Bensman and Gerver 1963, Brief Buttram and Dukerich 2001) perspectives. Studies in psychology and management have developed frameworks about when and how to punish (Arvey and Jones 1985, Butterfield Treviño and Ball 1996) , examined the consequences of punishment, particularly its impact on the attitudes and subsequent behavior of the punished individual Sims 1994, Podsakoff et al. 2006) , and looked at how organizational context variables (such as formal organizational systems or written policies and procedures)
shape punishment decisions (Beyer and Trice 1984, Klaas and Dell'Omo 1997) . However, this large body of work has overlooked how the social context of the transgression affects punishment decisions. Our research helps to fill this gap by showing how subtle contextual factors (in this case, conflicting social norms experienced by those responsible for punishing others' transgressions) play an important role in how people make punishment decisions.
Our research also has important practical implications for managers, who are commonly given broad discretion to punish employees for their small or large transgressions through oral reprimands, work suspension, or, in extreme cases, termination (Beyer and Trice 1984, Butterfield et al. 1996) . Punishment is in fact a widely used managerial strategy for producing desired changes in employee behavior (Ball et al. 1994 ).
Furthermore, certain jobs are charged with the formal responsibility to judge behavior and mete out punishment. Judges and jury members make conviction and punishment decisions, law enforcement officers have broad discretion in response to minor criminal acts, and regulators can levy fines against individuals and firms that violate civil codes. Such authorities have a social responsibility to protect the public from the harm of others' transgressions, yet are also vulnerable to the challenges associated with managing contradictory social norms that might bias their actions. Further work must examine whether increased specialization, training, or cognitive ability can reduce this tendency towards increased stringency, as our results on organizational differences indeed suggest.
Conclusion
We began this paper with a discussion of the use of discretion in punishment decisions. Our findings suggest that when authority figures have discretion over punishment decisions, being confronted with a social norm of leniency causes a negative reaction, which leads them to punish transgressors more harshly. This might lead to the conclusion that discretion is overrated or overused. However, when discretion is unavailable, as it is with mandatory punishment guidelines (e.g., "three strikes" laws), many dysfunctional consequences result, including higher rates of violence and murders among repeat offenders and against witnesses of repeat offenses (Marvell and Moody 2001, Zimring Hawkins and Kamin 2001) . Thus, eliminating discretion is likely not the answer. Instead, the message we take from our findings is that authorities with discretion over punishment should be vigilant about how they exercise that discretion in the face of norms that may motivate them toward leniency, lest they behave with unusual stringency. Note: Standard errors clustered at the officer level in parentheses. * significant at the 10% confidence level, ** significant at the 5% confidence level, *** significant at the 1% confidence level. Observations across models are not equal due to maximum likelihood estimation dropping perfectly predicted groups. 
